The use of the Quality Adjusted Life-Year (QALY) as a measure of the benefit obtainedfrom health care expenditure has been attacked on the ground that it gives a lower value to preserving the lives ofpeople with a permanent disability or illness than to preserving the lives of those who are healthy and not disabled. We can all agree that when we spend money from the public purse on health care, we should try to get value for money. But there the agreement stops. What is value for money in health care? The outcomes of health care expenditure are so diverse that we need a common standard by which to compare them. The most promising common standard, many believe, is the Quality Adjusted LifeYear, or QALY. In essence, this standard says that the value we get from spending money on health care can be measured in terms of the number of years of life gained, as long as we provide an appropriate rate of discount for periods in which, as a result of ill-health or disability, the quality of life is poor. Several techniques have been used to establish the appropriate rate of discount. The most direct of these, the time trade-off, asks people how long a
period of life in the given health condition they would be prepared to trade for one year of normal health. For example, they may say that for one year in normal health, they would give up two years bedridden. Then the appropriate rate of discount for being bedridden is 0 5, because that is the rate of quality adjustment at which a gain of two life-years when bedridden equals a gain of one year in normal health (1) .
There are, however, several objections to the use of the QALY as a way of measuring the value gained by a given unit of health care expenditure. This article deals with one of them: that for those who are unfortunate enough to have a permanent disability or illness, the use of the QALY as a measure of value gained by health care puts them at an additional disadvantage. The first appearance of this argument in the discussion of QALYs is, as far as we are aware, in an article by John Harris, and we follow him by referring to it as 'double jeopardy' (2) . In rejecting the Oregon plan for rationing health care, the United States Secretary for Health and Human Services used a form of the double jeopardy objection (3) .
Here is the way Harris puts the double jeopardy argument:
'QALYs dictate that because an individual is unfortunate, because she has once become a victim of disaster, we are required to visit upon her a second and perhaps graver misfortune. The first disaster leaves her with a poor quality of life and QALYs then require that in virtue of this she be ruled out as a candidate for life-saving treatment, or at best, that she be given little or no chance of benefiting from what little amelioration her condition admits of' (4).
What is sound, and what is unsound, in this objection?
Imagine that Karen is the victim of a disaster -to be precise, she has been injured in a car accident that has left her a paraplegic. She is confined to a wheelchair and has persistent, often severe, back pain. Let us assume that the QALY scale rates two years of life in this condition as worth one year of life in good health. Hence Karen's quality-of-life score is 0 5. Given her age and general health, her lifeexpectancy is another 40 years. Thus the number of QALYs that her life would be expected to contain, if her condition remains unchanged, is 20. Now let us assume that a treatment is available for Karen's back pain. She will still be a paraplegic, and need to use a wheelchair, but the pain will go entirely. Her qualityof-life score will rise from 0 5 to 0-75. The treatment will not change her life-expectancy. Hence the expected QALYs in her life will rise from 20 We accept, then, that there is some kind of double jeopardy in these circumstances. Intuitively, this seems unfair. But this intuition needs, at least, some scrutiny. If our resources are limited and we cannot save every life that could be saved by some form of health care, is it really unfair to give a lower priority to saving the lives of those with incurable conditions that significantly reduce their quality of life?
As a step towards an answer to this question, consider a final example. Two other patients, Otto and Richard have not been in any accidents, but they have heart conditions just like those of Michelle and Nina. Without transplants they will soon die, with transplants they will be able to continue to live their lives in full health. But Otto also has an entirely separate incurable medical condition that -while it causes him no problems now -will suddenly flare up and end his life. Because of this, his life expectancy is only twenty years, whereas Richard's is almost twice this -to be precise, 38 years.
In QALY terms, the Michelle/Nina pair of patients and the Otto/Richard pair are identical, and if heart transplants were being rationed on the basis of QALYs, preference would in each case be given to the second member of the pair. For (6).
And in a subsequent article Harris says:
'I believe that the value of life can only sensibly be taken to be that value that those alive place on their lives. Consequently, if you and I are of different ages but we both want to live, then it is unfair to prefer your life to mine simply because you are three months younger' (7).
The final sentence of the second passage invokes an example that makes it difficult to disagree with Harris's claim. But he is making it too easy for himself. If he wants to stand by the claim that the value of life is nothing else but the value that those alive place on their lives, he would have also to object to giving the treatment to Otto rather than Richard if they both wanted very much to live, even if the heart transplant could offer Otto only a year or two, while it still offered Richard 38 years (and, we assume, everything else about Otto Another ground for doubts about giving preference to Nina takes us into more fundamental ethical questions. This is the view that because Michelle has suffered more from her accident than Nina, it is only fair to redress the balance by now conferring a benefit on her rather than on Nina. On the QALY approach this regard for past suffering is not relevant. The QALY approach is wholly forward-looking. All that matters is putting resources where they will achieve the greatest future QALY gain. But there are problems with appealing in this way to past suffering in the allocation of health care resources. For example, it is an implication of the life-time view defended by Kappel and Sand0e that someone who is now suffering moderate or mild pain should have a higher priority for treatment than someone who is now suffering intense pain if the former person has suffered more in the past (provided that person's past suffering is greater than the anticipated suffering of the latter person, should he or she fail to receive treatment). In other words, it is an implication of the life-time view that, under certain circumstances, someone presently suffering less should be helped in preference to someone presently suffering more. As Kappel and Sand0e acknowledge, 'this seems counterintuitive' (9).
Kappel and Sand0e are not deterred by this criticism. They suggest that the intuition in favour of helping the person who is presently suffering more may reflect the fact that moderate and mild pain are comparatively tolerable without treatment, whereas intense pain must be treated unless the person is going to suffer badly. In support of this they suggest that if the difference in degree of suffering is lessened we are more inclined to favour the person suffering least (if they have suffered more in the past). 'Imagine that both persons suffer from intense pain but the pain of the first patient is just slightly more intense than the pain of the other patient. In that case it seems more reasonable to treat the person that earlier suffered the most pain' (9) .
Timeless view
However, in giving credence to the intuition that when the difference in degree of suffering is slight it is more reasonable to treat the person who earlier suffered the most pain, Kappel and Sandoe could be accused of begging the question. To the extent that the purpose of health care is to lessen pain and suffering, and to the extent that nothing humanly possible can be done to lessen past pain and suffering, it would seem more reasonable to treat the person who is presently suffering more, since at least this person's suffering can be lessened. Nothing can be done about past suffering, whereas (often) something can be done about present and future suffering. This (11) . Both suggest some form of impartiality; and John Rawls has drawn on this tradition by suggesting that we can decide whether social arrangements are just by asking if they would be agreed to by rational egoists choosing from behind a veil of ignorance (12) . The idea of the veil of ignorance is that it forces an impartial choice by preventing people knowing whether they will be advantaged or disadvantaged by the proposed arrangement. So, in this case, we imagine people choosing a basis for allocating health care without knowing whether, at some point in their lives, they will be in need of health care to prolong their lives; we imagine also that they do not know whether, if this happens, they will be among those whose interest in continued life is low, or among those whose interest is high.
How would two rational egoists choose if they were faced with a situation in which they each needed life-saving treatment, and each had an interest in continued life, but there was enough lifesaving treatment for only one? Obviously each would choose the treatment for herself, if he or she could; but suppose they had to make the choice behind a veil of ignorance, in which they knew the details of the two patients' conditions, but did not know which patient they were? They would certainly not choose the option of giving the treatment to neither patient. For this would mean that they would certainly die. In comparison with that prospect, tossing a coin would at least give them a 50 per cent chance of survival, and so would be preferable. But a random method would in turn seem less attractive than a method of selection that gives preference to the person with a stronger interest in continuing to live. For those choosing the basis for allocating health care will know that, if they choose a random method of selection in order to avoid discrimination in situations when a treatment cannot be given to everyone, then some with a higher interest in continued life will not receive such treatment. To maximise the satisfaction of their own interests, rational egoists would have to choose a system that gives preference to saving life when it is most in the interests of the person whose life is saved. This means that if QALYs were an accurate way of measuring when life is most in one's interests, then rational egoists would choose to allocate in accordance with QALYs. But they cannot do this without building double jeopardy into their principles of distribution. Thus by one widely accepted, and undoubtedly impartial, way of deciding on the justice of principles of distribution, double jeopardy is not a sign of injustice or unfairness.
The previous argument assumes that the rational egoist is faced with a life-and-death decision. A similar argument also applies to a case in which two people, at present equally disadvantaged, could each be given treatment that would improve their quality of life, but in one case, this would bring the patient back to full health, whereas in the other case, perhaps because of an unrelated pre-existing disability, the treatment would result in a lower quality of life. Let us also assume that both patients have a similar life-expectancy, and this is unaffected 
Overall utility
One final point. We have rejected the claim that QALYs are unjust or unfair because they lead to double jeopardy. This does not necessarily mean that we think that health care should always be distributed so as to produce the largest possible number of health-related QALYs. There is more to overall utility than health-related QALYs, and it is plausible to suppose that tilting the balance of health care towards the more disadvantaged members of society will reinforce feelings of concern and sympathy, and lead to a more compassionate society. This in turn may be a society with more community feeling and therefore one that provides a higher level of general welfare than a less compassionate society.
In a recent survey of the attitudes of Australians to the distribution of health care, we found that many respondents were ready to depart from QALY maximisation in order to avoid expressing a priority for the treatment of some patients over others, and this may also be explained by a concern for the effects that a direct maximisation approach has on the kind of society we are. For example, when asked whether, among patients who are suffering equally, some priority should be given to those who will be helped most from treatment, only about half (53 per cent) of those answering favoured doing so; the remainder thought that those who could become a little better should have the same priority as those who could become much better. Even more striking responses were received to a hypothetical choice between patients who can be helped at low cost and those who are equally ill, but can only be helped at high cost. Overwhelmingly (81 per cent) of respondents favoured equal treatment irrespective of cost, except when the costs are extremely high. Even when presented with a hypothetical example showing that giving priority to low-cost patients would allow more patients to be treated overall, most respondents did not choose to maximise health benefits (17) .
It is at least possible that Australians (and no doubt some other nationals as well) consider it important to act in ways that go beyond abstract justice or faimess, instead tilting the balance so that it favours those who would otherwise feel themselves arbitrarily disadvantaged. On these grounds, we could understand a preference for avoiding double jeopardy, even though double jeopardy is not in itself unjust or unfair.
